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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal addresses the duty of federal employers 
under the "reasonable accommodation" requirement of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701, et seq. We have 
held it is the burden of the disabled employee who seeks 
reassignment to identify a position appropriate for 
reassignment. See Shiring v. Runyon, 90 F.3d 827 (3d Cir. 
1996). At the same time, we believe "reasonable 
accommodation" includes the employer's reasonable efforts 
to assist the employee and to communicate with the 
employee in good faith. Because the employee, Michael 
Mengine, did not meet his burden and the employer, the 
United States Postal Service, satisfied its duty, we will 
affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment. 
 
I. 
 
Michael Mengine was employed by the United States 
Postal Service as a letter carrier. Following hip surgery for 
bilateral aseptic necrosis on November 23, 1992, Mengine 
could no longer carry out the duties of a letter carrier, 
which include prolonged walking and substantial lifting. As 
a result, Mengine received permission to take advanced sick 
leave (he had already exhausted his accrued sick leave). 
 
On January 13, 1993, Mengine requested assignment to 
temporary light duty work. This was approved for a period 
of 30 days. The approval recited that Mengine may not 
push or pull, lift over 10 pounds, or engage in excessive 
standing or walking. Mengine was not assigned to a specific 
light duty job, but told he would get work "as assigned." 
Subsequently, Mengine received one two-hour light duty 
assignment which required him to sort mail. Mengine then 
took advanced sick leave when no further light duty 
assignments were offered to him. 
 
On January 27, 1993, Mengine wrote to Postmaster 
William Dunn that he was "physically unable to continue" 
as a letter carrier. He requested "a transfer into another 
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craft," noting that he was "on advance sick leave and would 
like to return to full-time work as soon as possible." He 
attached a letter from his doctor stating he must avoid 
prolonged walking and heavy lifting. 
 
On February 2, 1993, Thomas Schimmel, the Senior 
Personnel Services Specialist, responded to Mengine's letter 
on behalf of the Postmaster, sending him descriptions of 
four vacant positions: mail handler, mail processor, laborer- 
custodian, and custodian. Mengine wrote back that, 
"[a]lthough I am ready, willing, and able to accept a transfer 
into another category, I do not feel that these particular job 
descriptions best suit my physical limitations." He 
requested information on other positions which would 
accommodate him and inquired about a computer 
maintenance training program. 
 
Schimmel responded that there were no positions 
available (other than the four mentioned above) that would 
accommodate Mengine's disability. He also stated that the 
Postal Service had no training program in computer 
maintenance: "We do have . . . positions [which] maintain 
our computer hardware and software relating to our 
automation equipment. However your limitations would 
prevent you from working in this area." The letter 
concluded with, "The only suggestion that I have for you at 
this time is that you might want to pursue, if eligible, 
Disability Retirement." 
 
On April 20, 1993, Mengine wrote again to the 
Postmaster and requested a transfer to a "desk job," or, in 
the alternative, reassignment to another federal agency. 
Once again, Schimmel responded on behalf of the 
Postmaster, stating, "In order for you to transfer to another 
government agency you must contact that agency and they 
will have to provide you the necessary requirements to 
transfer." 
 
Meanwhile, Mengine visited the Postal Service Human 
Resources Office and reviewed a list of job descriptions. He 
identified several positions that he believed would 
accommodate his limitations, but he was told none of these 
positions were vacant. 
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Mengine then applied for Social Security benefits 
claiming total disability. On September 28, 1993, the Social 
Security Administration approved his application. Two days 
later, Mengine applied for disability retirement under the 
Federal Employees' Retirement System, stating, "As a Letter 
Carrier, the requirements of my job are standing, walking, 
and lifting which I [no] longer can do without great 
difficulty and pain and without causing further damage to 
my hips." The Office of Personnel Management initially 
denied his application but on appeal found him eligible for 
disability retirement. 
 
In October 1993, Mengine filed this lawsuit against 
Marvin Runyon, Postmaster General of the United States 
Postal Service, claiming violations of the Rehabilitation Act. 
Specifically, he contends the Postal Service did not 
reasonably accommodate his disability because it refused to 
reassign him to another position. The district court 
dismissed Mengine's case for failing to timely exhaust 
administrative remedies, but the dismissal was reversed on 
appeal. Mengine v. Runyon, No. 94-3298 (3d Cir, Dec. 8, 
1994). 
 
The case was remanded and discovery ensued. In 
September 1995, William F. Greb, a Postal Service 
manager, testified at his deposition that temporary light 
duty work was available for Mengine in "collections." The 
work required driving a truck and picking up mail from 
office buildings. Mengine took the job for an indeterminate 
period. It appears he has since stopped working and once 
again accepted disability retirement.1  
 
After discovery, the parties filed cross motions for 
summary judgment. On April 26, 1996, the district court 
granted summary judgment to the Postal Service because 
Mengine failed to identify a permanent, vacant, funded 
position appropriate for his reassignment. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Mengine contends that after returning to work in September 1995, he 
contacted the Social Security Office to terminate his benefits. 
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II. 
 
This case arises under the Rehabilitation Act. The district 
court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review summary 
judgment decisions under a plenary standard. See Waldron 
v. SL Indus., Inc., 56 F.3d 491, 496 (3d Cir. 1995). We must 
apply the same test as the district court, i.e. we must view 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, 
and we may affirm only if "there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); 
Waldron, 56 F.3d at 496. 
 
III. 
 
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701, et. seq., 
forbids federal employers from discriminating against 
persons with disabilities in matters of hiring, placement or 
advancement. See Shiring v. Runyon, 90 F.3d 827, 830-31 
(3d Cir. 1996). In order for an employee to make out a 
prima facie case of discrimination under the Rehabilitation 
Act, the employee bears the burden of demonstrating: "(1) 
that he or she has a disability; (2) that he or she is 
otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the 
job, with or without reasonable accommodations by the 
employer; and (3) that he or she was nonetheless 
terminated or otherwise prevented from performing the job." 
Id. at 831.2 
 
Defendants moved for summary judgment based on their 
contention that Mengine could not prove he was an 
"otherwise qualified" employee. In response, Mengine 
admits he can no longer perform the job of letter carrier, 
but contends the Postal Service had a duty to reasonably 
accommodate him through reassignment to a different 
position. 
 
An employer is not required to create a job for a disabled 
employee. But a federal employer has a duty to reassign 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is applicable only to federal employers, 
such as the Postal Service, and employers who receive federal funding. 
See Shiring, 90 F.3d at 830. 
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nonprobationary employees if they become unable to 
perform the essential functions of their jobs, unless the 
reassignment would cause the employer undue hardship. 
See Shiring, 90 F.3d at 832. In bringing suit, it is Mengine's 
burden to "make at least a facial showing that such 
accommodation [reassignment] is possible." Id. Specifically, 
Mengine must "demonstrate that there were vacant, funded 
positions whose essential duties he was capable of 
performing, with or without reasonable accommodation, 
and that these positions were at an equivalent level or 
position as [his former job]." Id. 
 
Mengine maintains he satisfied his burden to identify a 
vacant, funded position by requesting transfer to a light 
duty position. In the alternative, he contends any failure on 
his part to identify such a position was caused by the 
Postal Service's refusal to cooperate. 
 
a. 
 
Mengine contends he satisfied his burden because he 
presented proof of the availability of light duty work. But 
the only light duty work available was temporary work. It is 
uncontested that Mengine was seeking permanent work. 
The Postal Service was not required to transform its 
temporary light duty jobs into permanent jobs to 
accommodate Mengine's disability. See Shiring, 90 F.3d at 
831. As we have noted, an employer is not required to 
create a job for a disabled employee. At the same time, we 
are reluctant to adopt a per se rule that the conversion of 
a temporary job to a permanent job can never constitute a 
"reasonable accommodation" under the Rehabilitation Act. 
We think that in most cases the imposition of such a 
requirement will be unreasonable, but there might arise the 
rare case in which the cost of converting the temporary job 
into a permanent one is slight and the benefits 
considerable. Cf. Vande Zande v. State of Wisconsin Dept. of 
Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542-43 (7th Cir. 1995). In this case, 
however, Mengine has not pointed to evidence from which 
a reasonable factfinder could conclude the costs of 
converting the temporary jobs at issue into permanent ones 
would have been so slight in relation to the benefits so as 
to make the conversion reasonable. In any event, Mengine 
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did not identify any available permanent jobs which he was 
capable of performing. He did not meet his burden under 
Shiring. 
 
b. 
 
Mengine also contends that any failure on his part to 
identify a vacant, funded position is the fault of the Postal 
Service, because it failed to cooperate with his efforts to 
investigate job descriptions and job vacancies. The district 
court rejected this contention, holding that federal 
employers do not have a duty to find other jobs for disabled 
employees.3 Soon after the district court's opinion, we made 
clear in Shiring, 90 F.3d at 832, that an employer has a 
duty to reassign a disabled employee if an already funded, 
vacant position at the same level exists. But "it falls to the 
employee to make at least a facial showing" that there were 
vacant, funded positions whose essential functions he was 
capable of performing. Id. Notwithstanding his burden, 
Mengine maintains a federal employer has a duty to aid the 
employee in his investigation. 
 
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed a 
similar issue in Beck v. University of Wisconsin Bd. of 
Regents, 75 F.3d 1130 (7th Cir. 1996). Lorraine Beck was 
the secretary to the Dean of the School of Nursing at the 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. She became severely 
depressed from job stress and had to take periodic leaves of 
absence. Beck's employer tried reassigning her to a less 
stressful position, and even tried to obtain more 
information from her doctor so that her needs could be 
satisfied, but Beck continued to suffer from depression. 
After her third leave of absence, Beck gave the University a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Mengine correctly notes that School Bd. of Nassau County. Fla. v. 
Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987), cited by the district court, no longer 
provides the applicable standard. Arline predates the 1992 amendments 
to the Rehabilitation Act, which substantially changed the standards 
used in determining whether the Act is violated. See Shiring, 90 F.3d at 
831-32 (stating that under Arline employers were not required to 
reassign disabled employees, but that after the 1992 amendments 
reassignment is mandatory unless it would cause the agency undue 
hardship). 
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letter from her doctor requesting "appropriate assistance 
with her work load," an "adjustable computer keyboard," 
and the tailoring of "her work load to what she & your staff 
feel she can realistically accomplish." The University moved 
Beck's desk and substantially decreased her work load, but 
she remained depressed. After Beck went on medical leave, 
she filed suit under Title I of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act ("ADA") for failing to reasonably 
accommodate her disability. The district court granted 
summary judgment to defendants. 
 
On appeal, the court of appeals discussed the duty of 
Beck's employer to reasonably accommodate her disability, 
holding, "The employer has at least some responsibility in 
determining the necessary accommodation. . . . [T]he 
regulations envision an interactive process that requires 
participation by both parties." Id. at 1135. The court was 
referring to the federal regulations implementing the ADA, 
which provide in part: 
 
To determine the appropriate reasonable 
accommodation it may be necessary for the [employer] 
to initiate an informal, interactive process with the 
qualified individual with a disability in need of the 
accommodation. This process should identify the 
precise limitations resulting from the disability and 
potential reasonable accommodations that could 
overcome those limitations. 
 
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3)(1995). 
 
[T]he employer must make a reasonable effort to 
determine the appropriate accommodation. The 
appropriate reasonable accommodation is best 
determined through a flexible, interactive process that 
involves both the employer and the [employee] with a 
disability. 
 
29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. at 351 (1996); see Beck, 75 F.3d 
at 1135. The court of appeals concluded that both employer 
and employee must "make reasonable efforts" to help 
determine "what specific accommodations are necessary." 
Beck, 75 F.3d at 1135. Because the employer in Beck made 
good faith efforts to communicate with Beck and to 
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accommodate her disability, the court affirmed summary 
judgment for defendants. 
 
Although Beck discussed this issue in the context of the 
ADA, it is relevant to our analysis of the Rehabilitation Act 
because in 1992 the Rehabilitation Act was amended to 
incorporate the standards of several sections of the ADA, 
including the section defining "reasonable accommodation."4 
29 U.S.C. § 794(d); see also Shiring, 90 F.3d at 831-32. 
 
We agree that both parties have a duty to assist in the 
search for appropriate reasonable accommodation and to 
act in good faith. In order to satisfy the requirements of the 
Rehabilitation Act, the Postal Service had the duty to make 
reasonable efforts to assist Mengine, to communicate with 
him in good faith, and to not impede his investigation. See 
Beck, 75 F.3d at 1135 ("A party that obstructs or delays the 
interactive process is not acting in good faith. A party that 
fails to communicate, by way of initiation or response, may 
also be acting in bad faith."); see also Hunt-Golliday v. 
Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago, 
104 F.3d 1004, 1012 (7th Cir. 1997) ("[D]etermining what 
specific actions should be taken by an employer requires an 
interactive process involving participation by both sides."); 
Taylor v. Principal Financial Group, Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 165 
(5th Cir. 1996) (The "employee's initial request for an 
accommodation . . . triggers the employer's obligation to 
participate in the interactive process . . . ."), cert. denied, 
117 S. Ct. 586 (1996). 
 
As we held in Shiring, the employee has the duty to 
identify a vacant, funded position whose essential functions 
he is capable of performing. Shiring, 90 F.3d at 832. But we 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The Rehabilitation Act now provides: 
 
The standards used to determine whether this section has been 
violated in a complaint alleging employment discrimination under 
this section shall be the standards applied under title I of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12111 et seq.) 
and the provisions of sections 501 through 504, and 510, of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12201-12204 and 
12210), as such sections relate to employment. 
 
29 U.S.C. § 794(d). 
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do not suggest that the employee has the burden of 
identifying an open position before the employer's duty of 
accommodation is triggered. In many cases, an employee 
will not have the ability or resources to identify a vacant 
position absent participation by the employer. Simply put, 
a disabled employee seeking reassignment will be best 
served by employer and employee working together to 
identify suitable positions. 
 
When the interactive process works well, it furthers the 
purposes of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. The 
employers will not always know what kind of work the 
worker with the disability can do, and conversely, the 
worker may not be aware of the range of available 
employment opportunities, especially in a large company. 
Thus, the interactive process may often lead to the 
identification of a suitable position. If it turns out there is 
no job which the worker (with or without accommodation) 
is capable of performing, then the company cannot be held 
liable for an ADA or Rehabilitation Act violation. See Willis 
v. Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d 282, 285 (11th Cir. 1997) 
("[W]here a plaintiff cannot demonstrate `reasonable 
accommodation,' the employer's lack of investigation into 
reasonable accommodation is unimportant. . . . The ADA, 
as far as we are aware, is not intended to punish employers 
for behaving callously if, in fact, no accommodation for the 
employee's disability could reasonably have been made."). 
To the extent there is any tension between Beck and Willis 
it may be more a matter of timing; at all events, if 
reasonable accommodation is impossible, nothing more 
than communication to the employee of this fact is 
required. Nonetheless, if an employer fails to engage in the 
interactive process, it may not discover a way in which the 
employee's disability could have been reasonably 
accommodated, thereby risking violation of the 
Rehabilitation Act. 
 
Mengine contends the Postal Service impeded his search 
for a vacant, funded position. For example, when he 
reviewed job descriptions at the Postal Service Human 
Resources Office, he was not permitted to photocopy job 
descriptions of unavailable positions. He also points to the 
February 18, 1993 letter from Schimmel which concludes 
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with, "The only suggestion that I have for you at this time 
is that you might want to pursue, if eligible, Disability 
Retirement." But this evidence is not indicative of bad faith. 
Mengine and the Postal Service engaged in the interactive 
process contemplated by the federal regulations. The 
uncontradicted evidence shows the parties exchanged many 
letters in their mutual attempt to identify a vacant, funded 
position for reassignment. The Postal Service sent Mengine 
multiple job descriptions of vacant positions in an effort to 
meet his needs. The additional job descriptions Mengine 
wanted to photocopy were not vacant positions and 
therefore could not have aided his search. The Postal 
Service made reasonable efforts to assist Mengine, 
communicated with him in good faith, and did not act to 
impede his investigation. See Beck, 75 F.3d at 1137 
("[W]here, as here, the employer does not obstruct the 
process, but instead makes reasonable efforts both to 
communicate with the employee and provide 
accommodations based on the information it possessed, 
ADA liability simply does not follow."). 
 
IV. 
 
Because no reasonable jury could find the Postal Service 
violated its duty here, we will affirm the judgment of the 
district court.5 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. In its brief, the Postal Service contended Mengine may be estopped 
from claiming ability to work with reasonable accommodation because he 
asserted total disability to the Social Security Administration. See 
McNemar v. Disney Stores, 91 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 
S. Ct. 958 (1997). But at oral argument, the Postal Service stated it did 
not wish to pursue this argument.                                 
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